Investigative Support for Information Confidentiality Part I: Detecting Confidential Information Leakage via Protocol-based Covert Channels  by Jaskolka, Jason et al.
 Procedia Computer Science  34 ( 2014 )  276 – 285 
1877-0509 © 2014 Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Conference Program Chairs
doi: 10.1016/j.procs.2014.07.023 
ScienceDirect
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
The 9th International Conference on Future Networks and Communications
(FNC-2014)
Investigative Support for Information Conﬁdentiality
Part I: Detecting Conﬁdential Information Leakage via
Protocol-Based Covert Channels
Jason Jaskolkaa,∗, Ridha Khedria, Khair Eddin Sabrib
a Department of Computing and Software, Faculty of Engineering, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada
b Department of Computer Science, King Abdullah II School for Information Technology, The University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan
Abstract
This is Part I in a two-part series discussing the development of investigative support for information conﬁdentiality. In this paper,
we propose a technique to detect conﬁdential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels based on relation algebra.
It provides tests to verify the existence of an information leakage via a monitored covert channel as well as computations which
show how the information was leaked if a leakage exists. We also report on a prototype tool that allows for the automation of the
proposed technique. Our focus is limited to protocol-based covert channels and instances where covert channel users modulate the
sent information by some form of encoding such as encryption.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
Today, the protection of large amounts of sensitive information is at the forefront of security concerns. In modern
organisations, the prospect of the leakage of sensitive information ranks among the highest fears of any executive1.
As many of these organisations depend on broad and heterogeneous communication networks, there are numerous
possibilities for the exﬁltration of sensitive information and the detection of such threats presents many challenges.
With the ongoing threat of insiders with the intent to inappropriately access and divulge information, we must strive
to devise new support to investigate those individuals who may be responsible for the breach of conﬁdentiality.
A security policy, or more speciﬁcally, a conﬁdentiality policy limits access to certain information. As a result,
conﬁdential information is deﬁned as the information that is protected by a conﬁdentiality policy. This paper focusses
on detecting conﬁdential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels. Covert channels can be used to
transmit conﬁdential information in a secret manner. A covert channel is any communication means that can be
exploited to transfer information in a manner that violates the security policy2. In particular, a protocol-based covert
channel uses the communication protocol to convey messages that violate the security policy. A thorough survey of
covert channels and a model for their morphology is given in Jaskolka & Khedri3.
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There are shortcomings in the science, mathematics, and fundamental theory to deal with covert channels in modern
computer systems4. Due to a lack of use of formal methods, protocol speciﬁcations often allow for uses in unantic-
ipated or unintended ways which enable the establishment of covert channels whilst adhering to the speciﬁcation5.
The resulting transmissions cannot be considered anomalous, leading to the diﬃculty of detecting such channels. We
propose mathematical formulations for protocol-based covert channels and develop a formal and rigorous technique
for the detection of conﬁdential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels using algebraic techniques. A
formal technique gives us more power and ﬂexibility than that which could be done with heuristics. It also allows us
to mechanise and automate the computations needed to discover the use of covert channels and to build and conﬁgure
monitors which are able to supervise a system for which we strive for conﬁdentiality.
To the best of our knowledge, a formal technique such as the one we propose does not exist. Several works (e.g.,
Hélouët & Roumy6) examine covert channel detection and analysis from the perspective of information theory by, for
instance, analysing channel capacities. We propose a technique that tackles the problem from a diﬀerent perspective.
This leads to fertile grounds for developing a theory of covert channels and provides us with new and innovative ways
to handle the threat of covert channels to the conﬁdentiality of information. In particular, we look to help in detecting
streams of conﬁdential information being leaked from a data store over an extended period of time as a means of
providing investigative support for information conﬁdentiality.
In Section 2, we introduce the required mathematical background including relations and their operations. In
Section 3, we describe the process by which we formulate a technique to detect conﬁdential information leakage
via protocol-based covert channels. In Section 4, we present the proposed technique. In Section 5, we examine the
automation of the proposed technique using a prototype tool implemented in the functional programming language
Haskell. In Section 6, we provide a brief discussion of the proposed technique and related work. Finally, in Section 7,
we draw conclusions and suggest future work.
2. Mathematical Background
Let X and Y be two sets. A relation R on X×Y is a subset of the Cartesian product X×Y . In the rest of this paper, I
denotes the identity relation, L denotes the universal relation, and ∅ denotes the empty relation.
Deﬁnition 1 (e.g., Schmidt & Ströhlein7). Let P ⊆ X × Y and Q ⊆ Y × Z be relations.
1. P ; Q def= {(x, z) | ∃(y | y ∈ Y : (x, y) ∈ P ∧ (y, z) ∈ Q )} is the relational composition of P and Q.
2. P def= {(x, y) | (y, x) ∈ P} is the converse of P.
3. P def= {(x, y) | (x, y)  P} is the complement of P.
Deﬁnition 2 (e.g., Schmidt & Ströhlein7). If R is a relation, then we say
1. R is total ⇐⇒ ∀(S |: R ; S ⊆ R ; S )
2. R is univalent ⇐⇒ ∀(S |: R ; S ⊆ R ; S )
3. R is a mapping ⇐⇒ ∀(S |: R ; S = R ; S )
4. R is surjective ⇐⇒ R is total
5. R is injective ⇐⇒ R is univalent
6. R is bijective ⇐⇒ R is surjective and injective
Residues are special operations on relations that help solve equations of the form P ; X = Q or X ; P = Q.
Deﬁnition 3 (Schmidt & Ströhlein7). Let P and Q be two relations.
1. Q/P def= Q ; P is the left residue of Q by P 2. P\Q def= P ; Q is the right residue of Q by P
The left residue gives the greatest relation X such that X ; P ⊆ Q (see Proposition 1(1)). Similarly, the right residue
gives the greatest relation X such that P ; X ⊆ Q (see Proposition 1(2)).
Proposition 1. Let P, Q and X be relations.
1. X ; P ⊆ Q ⇐⇒ X ⊆ Q/P 2. P ; X ⊆ Q ⇐⇒ X ⊆ P\Q
Proof. The proof can be found in Schmidt & Ströhlein7.
In some cases, it is required that a relation be a left residue and right residue simultaneously.
Deﬁnition 4 (e.g., Schmidt & Ströhlein7). For relations P and Q, the symmetric quotient is deﬁned as
syq(P,Q) def= P ; Q ∩ P ; Q = (P\Q) ∩ (P/Q).
The symmetric quotient syq(P,Q) is deﬁned as the greatest relation X such that P ; X ⊆ Q and X ; Q ⊆ P.
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3. Formulation of a Detection Technique
3.1. Assumptions
Suppose that we have a system with at least two communicating agents. We assume that the communicating agents
have a predeﬁned scheme regarding how the information is transmitted from its source to its destination. This includes
an agreement on the protocol to be exploited and the ﬁelds of the data structure to be used. This assumption is common
in the literature8,9 and ensures that the receiving agent is able to recover the communicated information. We also
assume that the communication among agents is recorded by monitors which begin recording when a communication
channel is established and that they maintain an unbounded history of all of the communication which has taken
place. This assumption ensures that the monitors have a record of all of the transmissions between the communicating
agents. A similar assumption is made in the literature8,10, where the monitors or wardens have access to all of the
messages passed between the communicating agents. Finally, we assume that the monitor always knows the set of
conﬁdential information that is responsible to watch.
3.2. Representing Information Streams as Relations
A crucial step in the formulation of the problem of detecting conﬁdential information leakage via covert channels is
ﬁnding an appropriate abstract representation for the information being sent on a channel. We represent the informa-
tion sent on a channel as a relation (i.e., a series of data structures which are sent over time). At each time, an element
of information is sent. This is commonly the case when data is serialised during communication. In this way, the data
is concretely being transmitted as a stream of information. A stream of information can be seen as a subset of the
Cartesian product of time and the state space of a data structure. If we model time by N and the set of information (or
data) by D, then a stream S is a subset of N×D. Therefore, it is a relation and more precisely, it is a function when we
consider only one channel (without noise). We associate each datum with the time stamp at which it was received. For
example, if the data sent on the channel was the sequence of characters ‘h’, ‘e’, ‘l’, ‘l’, ‘o’ to form the word “hello”,
the information that is sent on the stream is formed as the relation R = {(1, ‘h’), (2, ‘e’), (3, ‘l’), (4, ‘l’), (5, ‘o’)}, where
‘h’ was sent at time 1, ‘e’ was sent at time 2, and so on.
In order to uncover a conﬁdential information leakage via a protocol-based covert channel, we show that it is
suﬃcient to ﬁnd an abstraction relation between the conﬁdential information and the stream of information observed
to have been sent on the channel. An abstraction relation X can be seen as a simulation relation between two relations P
and Q. In Figure 1, the relation P represents the conﬁdential information which should not be sent on the channel,
the relation Q (henceforth referred to as the observed information) represents the information observed by a monitor
watching the information sent on the communication channel, and the relation X represents an abstraction relation






Fig. 1: A representation of the relationship between the relations P and Q via the abstraction relation X
An abstraction relation X requires that the diagram given in Figure 1 commutes. After simpliﬁcation, we ﬁnd that
the diagram in Figure 1 commutes in twoa ways, characterised by the following equations.
(1) Q ; X = P (2) P ; X = Q
In each case, the conﬁdential information represented by P is known. The observed information represented by Q
is known only after observing the information that is sent on the communication channel. We are looking to ﬁnd
a solution to Equation (1) or Equation (2) which is an abstraction relation X relating the relations P and Q. In
a The diagram in Figure 1 actually commutes in four ways. The reader can ﬁnd details on the commutativity of Figure 1 and the simpliﬁcation
of the diagrams in Jaskolka et al. 11.
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terms of covert channels, the solution is an abstraction relation relating the conﬁdential information and the observed
information.
An information leakage is considered to be detected if and only if there exists an abstraction relation between the
conﬁdential information and the observed information such that the abstraction relation is diﬀerent from ∅ and L.
The case where an abstraction relation is equal to ∅ indicates that there is no abstraction and thus no relationship
between the conﬁdential information and the observed information. The case where an abstraction relation is equal
to L indicates that all information is related to all other information. In this case, the abstraction becomes irrelevant.
We allocate a complete subsection (see Section 6.1) to discuss this matter and its impact on the scope of applicability
of the proposed technique.
4. The Proposed Detection Technique
The proposed technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels has two
major components: monitoring the information sent on the communication channel and ﬁnding and computing an
abstraction relation relating the conﬁdential information to the observed information.
4.1. Monitoring the Communication Channels
If an organisation wishes to detect if its conﬁdential information is being leaked outside of the organisation, it
can install a monitor on the known communication channels from which an agent from within the organisation can
communicate with an agent outside the organisation. The monitor can perform either a post-mortem analysisb or a
periodic real-time analysis looking for an abstraction relation between the conﬁdential information and the observed
information. We can view the monitor as a specialised and customisable packet sniﬀer in the case of covert channels
exploiting the use of network protocols. In order for the monitor to be eﬀective, we must assume that it is conﬁgured
with the protocol in which the communicating agents are using in order to communicate, the header of the particular
protocol which is being used as the carrier for the covert information, the conﬁdential information, and the set of tests
which can be run in order to verify whether there is an abstraction relation between the conﬁdential information and
the information that is observed by the monitor.
The monitor watches the stream of packets being transmitted on a communication channel. Based on its conﬁg-
uration, the monitor can either extract the header ﬁeld from the protocol packets that it is monitoring as they are
being transmitted and store them, or it can mirror and store the packets of the protocol and then extract the prescribed
header ﬁeld at a later time so as not to interrupt the performance of the communication channel. The monitor needs
to determine whether the conﬁdential information has been leaked in any capacity by verifying the existence of an
abstraction relation X which relates the conﬁdential information and the observed information.
4.2. Finding an Abstraction Relation
In the general context, the existence of an abstraction relation X which relates two relations P and Q can be veriﬁed
using Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. X ; P = Q has a solution if and only if Q = (Q/P) ; P.
Proof. The proof involves the application of Proposition 1, trading rules, the One-Point Axiom and the isotony of
relational composition. The detailed proof can be found in Jaskolka et al. 11.
Proposition 2 is used as a test to verify if there is an abstraction between the relations P and Q. It should be noted
that in Proposition 2, P and Q are merely relations and do not explicitly represent the conﬁdential information or
observed information in particular. However, it is easy to see that if we take the converse of both sides of X ; P = Q,
we obtain P ; X = Q. Then, we can have relations P′ = Q and Q′ = P representing the conﬁdential and observed
b Post-mortem analysis refers to the fact that the analysis is being done in a digital forensics context whereby conﬁdential information may have
already been leaked and the damage may already be done.
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information respectively. As a result, we are left with Equation (1). In a similar fashion, we can obtain an equation
corresponding to Equation (2). In this way, the test is directly related to Figure 1 in that if the test holds, we can say that
the diagram in Figure 1 commutes and we can ﬁnd an abstraction relation X that satisﬁes Equation (1) or Equation (2).
Therefore, we can say that the conﬁdential information P seems to have been leaked using the abstraction given by X
and was sent as the observed information Q.
Corollary 1. Let P be the relation containing conﬁdential information. Let Q be a relation representing the observed
information on a monitored communication channel. The conﬁdential information contained in P is being leaked as
that represented by Q if and only if P = Q ; (Q\P) ∨ Q = P ; (P\Q).
Proof. The proof involves the application of Proposition 2 and basic properties of relations and residues. The detailed
proof can be found in Jaskolka et al. 11.
In Corollary 1, we verify whether the diagram in Figure 1 commutes in at least one of the two ways characterised
by Equation (1) and Equation (2). Each term of the disjunction in the test corresponds to one of the ways in which
Figure 1 can commute. Therefore, as long as we can satisfy at least one of the ways in which the diagram commutes,
we can ﬁnd an abstraction relation X that satisﬁes Equation (1) or Equation (2). Then, provided that the abstraction
relation X is not the empty relation ∅ or the universal relation L, we can conclude that the conﬁdential information has
been leaked via the communication channel on which the observed information was sent. In this way, the condition
in Corollary 1 establishes the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the commutativity of Figure 1.
4.3. Computing the Abstraction Relation
Using Proposition 3, we are able to compute the abstraction relation X. The proposition also allows for ﬁltering
on the abstraction relation to look for an abstraction which maps particular elements of the conﬁdential information
to particular elements of the observed information. The ﬁltering relation is designed by the analyst and is represented
by R. Proposition 3 provides the general solution to an equation X ; P = Q.
Proposition 3. Let P, Q, and R be relations. X ; P = Q has a solution X = R ∩ (Q/P) if and only if
Q ⊆ (R ∩ (Q/P)) ; P.
Proof. The proof involves the application of Deﬁnition 3, basic properties of relations and residues, as well as anti-
symmetry and weakening. The detailed proof can be found in Jaskolka et al. 11.
The relation R plays the role of a ﬁlter. A ﬁlter allows for the removal of some unwanted elements of the transmitted
sequences. In its most general case, if we consider the ﬁlter R to be the universal relation L, then we are interested
in all of the elements of the transmission. Otherwise, we can select the elements of the range of the conﬁdential
information for which we wish to ﬁnd an abstraction by choosing diﬀerent ﬁltering relations for R. For instance,
if we suspect that the conﬁdential information is sent using only a subset SP of DP, then we can ﬁlter using the
relation R = {(dp, dq) | dp ∈ SP ∧ dq ∈ DQ}. By computing an abstraction relation which is not the empty
relation ∅ or the universal relation L, we can say that we have uncovered a leakage of conﬁdential information on the
communication channel.
Corollary 2. Let P be the relation containing conﬁdential information. Let Q be a relation representing the observed
information on the monitored communication channel. Let R be a ﬁltering relation allowing for the selection of
particular elements of the relations P and Q. The conﬁdential information included in P is being leaked as that
represented by Q via the abstraction relation X such that
1. X = R ∩ (Q\P) if and only if P ⊆ Q ; (R ∩ (Q\P))
2. X = R ∩ (P\Q) if and only if Q ⊆ P ; (R ∩ (P\Q))
3. X = R ∩ syq(P,Q) if and only if P ⊆ Q ; (R ∩ (Q\P)) ∧ Q ⊆ P ; (R ∩ (P\Q))
Proof. The proofs involve the application of Proposition 3 and basic properties of relations. The proof for (3) also
involves the Golden Rule Axiom. The detailed proof can be found in Jaskolka et al. 11.
Corollary 2 gives three cases for which we can compute the abstraction relation X in our speciﬁc context. In each
case, we compute the abstraction relation X according to the way(s) in which Figure 1 commutes.
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4.4. Modulating the Conﬁdential Information Before Transmission
Suppose that two communicating agents modulate the conﬁdential information by some agreed upon scheme and
then encrypt the modulated information so as to add another level of abstraction to the transmitted information.
Proposition 4 shows how the modulation of the conﬁdential information prior to the encryption and transmission
makes no diﬀerence on the ability to detect whether it has been leaked in some form. This highlights the point that
some kinds of encryption of the information do not matter. Since we know the conﬁdential information and we
observe the information that is being sent on the channel, we do not need to know how the information was encrypted.
If an abstraction relation exists between the conﬁdential information P and the observed information Q, then even if
a modulation of P by some relation M, that is total and injective, is transmitted as Q, we can still ﬁnd an abstraction
relation relating P and Q without knowing M.
Proposition 4. Let P be a relation containing conﬁdential information. Let M be a total and injective relation that
modulates the conﬁdential information in some way such that the modulated conﬁdential information is represented
by (P ; M). Let Q be a relation representing the observed information on a monitored communication channel. If the
conﬁdential information contained in P is being leaked as that represented by Q then the modulation using M of the
conﬁdential information contained in P is also being leaked as that represented by Q
(
i.e., ∃(X |: P ; X = Q ) =⇒
∃(Y |: P ; M ;Y = Q )).
Proof. The proof involves the properties of total and injective relations, as well as the application of Proposition 2,
and basic properties of relations and residues. The detailed proof can be found in Jaskolka et al. 11.
We require that the modulation relation be total and injective. To ensure that no information is lost during the
modulation, the totality of the modulation relation ensures that, when composed with the relation containing the
conﬁdential information, all of the conﬁdential information is represented in some form in the modulated conﬁdential
information. The injectivity of the modulation relation ensures that no inconsistencies are introduced which lead to a
loss of information and can cause the tests to be averted. The reader can ﬁnd more details on the aversion of the tests
in Jaskolka et al. 11.
5. A Prototype Tool for Automating the Proposed Detection Technique
We implemented a prototype tool, written in the functional programming language Haskell, to automate the pro-
cess of detecting conﬁdential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels. The prototype tool employs a
layered architecture. Each layer of the tool specialises in a set of related activities. One of the main services provided
by the prototype tool is covert channel analysis. The covert channel analysis service oﬀers tools to detect conﬁdential
information leakage via protocol-based covert channels. These tools correspond to the corollaries of the proposed
technique from Section 4 and can be used to verify whether conﬁdential information has been leaked and to compute
the corresponding abstraction relation if it is found that one does indeed exist. A brief example illustrating the usage of
the prototype tool to automate the proposed technique is given in Section 5.1. For more discussion of the architecture
design and more examples on the usage of the prototype tool we refer the reader to Part II of this series of papers12
and to Jaskolka et al. 11.
5.1. An Illustrative Example of the Automation of the Proposed Detection Technique
Consider a system where two agents, A and B, are communicating. Suppose that A is communicating from within
an organisation and that B is communicating from outside the organisation. Suppose that the organisation has a
security policy which deﬁnes its conﬁdential information to be the sequence of the ﬁrst ten digits of the number π.
This is to say that we have P = {(1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 4), (4, 1), (5, 5), (6, 9), (7, 2), (8, 6), (9, 5), (10, 3)} which is a
representation of the sequence 〈3, 1, 4, 1, 5, 9, 2, 6, 5, 3〉.
Assume that A and B agree on a scheme for transmitting the conﬁdential information. It is decided that A will
exploit the Internet Protocol (IP), in particular, the IP Identiﬁcation ﬁeld in order to leak the conﬁdential information
to B. The IP Identiﬁcation ﬁeld is used to uniquely identify an IP datagram within a ﬂow of datagrams that share the
same source and destination. Since the value for the IP Identiﬁcation ﬁeld should be chosen at random, it is possible
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to choose a non-random value for the ﬁeld without interrupting the IP mechanism5. Suppose that A uses the 16-bit IP
Identiﬁcation ﬁeld to send, in a sequence of IP datagrams, the set of conﬁdential information of its organisation. In
order to attempt to mask the data being sent, A ﬁrst encrypts the information before embedding it into the IP header.
For this purpose, A uses a public key encryption technique to encrypt the information. The encryption generates the
sequencec 〈12, 1, 16, 1, 17, 18, 11, 6, 17, 12〉 in place of the sequence 〈3, 1, 4, 1, 5, 9, 2, 6, 5, 3〉.
Suppose that the organisation from which A is communicating installs a monitor conﬁgured to extract the IP
Identiﬁcation ﬁeld from the transmitted IP datagrams associated with the communication between A and B. Then, the
information that the monitor records is the sequence 〈12, 1, 16, 1, 17, 18, 11, 6, 17, 12〉. This observed information
is stored in a ﬁle which, from this point forward, we call observed.seq. Also, assume that the monitor is already
conﬁgured with the set of conﬁdential information, which in this case is the sequence 〈3, 1, 4, 1, 5, 9, 2, 6, 5, 3〉. This
sequence is stored in a ﬁle which we call confidential.seq.
We wish to analyse the information that the monitor observed to have been sent on the communication channel
to verify whether the conﬁdential information has been leaked in some form. We start by loading the prototype tool
modules in the Glasgow Haskell Compiler’s interactive environment (ghci) and we create a new data store ﬁle called
ExampleDB to store all of the relations for this session so that we can quickly recall them for later use. This is done
with the following commands:
> :load PrototypeTool
> new "ExampleDB"
Next, we load the ﬁles into the prototype tool to construct the internal relational representation of the information
by issuing the following commands:
> loadRel "observed.seq" "observed" "ExampleDB"
> observed <- select "observed" "ExampleDB"
> loadRel "confidential.seq" "confidential" "ExampleDB"
> confidential <- select "confidential" "ExampleDB"
These commands construct the relational representation of the information contained in observed.seq and
confidential.seq as the relations {(1, 12), (2, 1), (3, 16), (4, 1), (5, 17), (6, 18), (7, 11), (8, 6), (9, 17), (10, 12)}
and {(1, 3), (2, 1), (3, 4), (4, 1), (5, 5), (6, 9), (7, 2), (8, 6), (9, 5), (10, 3)}, respectively, and stores them in the data store
ExampleDB. We then select the relations from the data store, where they are represented as set-valued maps, to be
used in the tests and computations.
Once the ﬁles have been loaded, we can perform the ﬁrst test: verifying the existence of an abstraction relation.
The test function corresponds to Corollary 1.
> print (test confidential observed)
True
Here the result is True. This means that there exists an abstraction relation which relates the conﬁdential infor-
mation to the observed information meaning that the conﬁdential information has been leaked in some form on the
communication channel.
As we have veriﬁed that an abstraction relation does indeed exist, we can compute the abstraction relation relating
the conﬁdential information to the observed information. In the prototype tool, the universal relation L is represented
as the restricted universal relation on P and Q, denoted L|P,Q, where P and Q are relations and L|P,Q def= {(x, y) | x ∈
ran(P) ∧ y ∈ ran(Q)}. This representation is required since, in the implementation of the prototype tool, we need
to deﬁne the universal relation on a ﬁnite space. For the computation, the ﬁlter R from Corollary 2 is the universal
relation restricted on the relations confidential and observed and is denoted by top. The computation of the
abstraction relation is done with the compute function which corresponds to Corollary 2.
> printRel (compute confidential observed top)
As a result, we ﬁnd that the abstraction relation is given by X = {(1, 1), (2, 11), (3, 12), (4, 16), (5, 17), (6, 6), (9, 18)}.
As an example, the prototype tool outputs a relation which contains "1" |-> ["1"] and "2" |-> ["11"], showing
that in the conﬁdential information, a 1 was transmitted as 1 in the observed information and a 2 was transmitted as 11,
respectively.
c This sequence is generated using RSA encryption with p = 3, q = 7, N = 21, e = 5, d = 41.
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With this short illustrative example, we have shown the use of the prototype tool to verify the existence of and
to compute the abstraction relation relating the conﬁdential information to the information observed to be sent on a
communication channel.
6. Discussion and Related Work
The proposed relation model oﬀers simplicity when carrying out the computations required in detecting conﬁdential
information leakage via protocol-based covert channels. The stream representation allows us to take intervals of data
from the channel and examine each interval, leading to computations of ﬁnite relations rather than inﬁnite ones.
Furthermore, relations are simple mathematical concepts that oﬀer a certain level of abstraction in the model of covert
channels which gives much more power and ﬂexibility in the ability to model particular types of covert channels.
With the proposed technique, we are interested in uncovering a stream of data being leaked from a data store over
some period of time. This means that we do not handle cases where, for example, a single key is sent in one data
package. In this way, the proposed technique is similar to other techniques such as those which use machine learning
techniques, such as neural networks (e.g., Tumoian & Anikeev13), to analyse data streams for anomalies indicating
the possible existence of a covert channel. Since machine learning techniques require training data, it is impossible to
discover a covert channel using a single data package13.
6.1. What the Proposed Technique Tells Us About Detecting Information Leakages
It is generally agreed that it is impossible to completely eliminate covert channels14. Because of this, it is not
surprising that the proposed technique points to ways in which covert channel users can avert the test for the exis-
tence of an abstraction relation so that users of protocol-based covert channels would be able to transmit conﬁdential
information without detection.
Consider a scenario where the conﬁdential information is a sequence of four bits: 〈0, 0, 1, 1〉. Suppose the encoding
scheme is to complement every second bit, yielding 〈0, 1, 1, 0〉. Therefore, the conﬁdential information is represented
by P = {(1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 1), (4, 1)} and the observed information is represented by Q = {(1, 0), (2, 1), (3, 1), (4, 0)}.
By applying the proposed technique, we can see that the resulting abstraction relation is X = L (i.e., X is the uni-
versal relation). Similarly, consider a scenario where we assume that there is a single conﬁdential information p.
Also, suppose that the sequence of communication is 〈q1, q2, q3, q4〉. Then, the conﬁdential information is represented
by P = {(1, p), (2, p), (3, p), (4, p)} and the observed information is represented by Q = {(1, q1), (2, q2), (3, q3), (4, q4)}.
Again, the proposed technique ﬁnds that the abstraction relation is X = {(p, q1), (p, q2), (p, q3), (p, q4)} or equiva-
lently, X = L on the ranges of P and Q. These simple examples illustrate that if the abstraction relation X = L, we do
not obtain any information that can aid in uncovering conﬁdential information leakage, since we ﬁnd that it is possible
that the observed information could be any other information.
More precisely, the proposed technique reveals that we are unable to uncover the leakage of conﬁdential informa-
tion if it has been encoded using a non-injective abstraction relation. When the abstraction relation is non-injective,
we cannot be sure which elements of the observed information correspond to the elements of the conﬁdential informa-
tion. Even if the abstraction relation is injective, it cannot be guaranteed that we will still be able to properly decode
the observed information to determine if the conﬁdential information has been leaked as it may be the case that we
have a situation similar to the second example given above, where X is injective but we only have a single data packet
which does not provide enough information to distinguish whether the conﬁdential information has been leaked.
By revealing that we are unable to detect conﬁdential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels when
the abstraction relation is non-injective, the proposed technique formally conﬁrms a selection of results which we
informally hold to be true. For instance, the use of any sort of sophisticated encoding schemes, such as block-ciphers
which might use cipher block chaining techniques, will lead to an encoding of the conﬁdential information with a non-
injective abstraction relation. Therefore, the proposed technique will be unable to uncover this leakage. Similarly,
the use of a uniformly random one-time pad will allow for the test for the existence of an abstraction relation to be
averted. This is not to say that we are unable to develop heuristics which can hint at whether there has been a leakage
of conﬁdential information via protocol-based covert channels, but formally we cannot uncover such a leakage using
the proposed technique. However, it is possible for agents communicating conﬁdential information via a protocol-
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based covert channel to use an unsophisticated encoding scheme or possibly no encoding scheme at all (e.g., Smeets
& Koot5). In such cases, the proposed technique oﬀers a means for detecting conﬁdential information leakages.
6.2. A Comment on the Feasibility
With regard to the feasibility of the proposed technique, concerns might be raised relating to the ability to handle the
potentially enormous relations representing the conﬁdential and observed information as well as the ability to record
and store all of the information that is transmitted during a communication session. However, the technology required
to manage these concerns does indeed exist. For instance, with regard to handling and managing the potentially
enormous relations, one can use Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) and existing libraries such as the BuDDY BDD
library, which can handle relations of sizes about 232 where each node requires only about 20 bytes of memory15. With
regard to the ability to record and store all of the information that is transmitted during a communication session, we
ﬁnd that technology exists which can aid in alleviating such concerns. A full packet capture of a saturated 1 Gbps link
will yield approximately 6TB of data16. Such packet capture can be done using existing libraries such as LibPCAP
which is used the common Wireshark packet capture application17. Other technologies, such as those provided by
Emulex, including the EndaceProbe 7000 intelligent network recorder18, oﬀer network monitoring and recording of
communication links up to 10 Gbps with up to 64TB of storage. Such capabilities can be used to monitor and record
the traﬃc existing on the whole network, however, the proposed technique only requires the monitoring and recording
of communication on a single communication channel which will have signiﬁcantly less ﬂow than the entire network.
Therefore, the issues concerning the ability to record and store all of the information that is transmitted during a
communication session can be mitigated with existing technologies. Thus, the proposed technique is feasible, but due
to resource limitations, we do not provide a full scale feasibility study in this paper.
6.3. A Comment on the Complexity
Let n be the cardinality of a relation. Unary operators, such as the complement and converse, have an O(n) compu-
tational complexity19. The computational complexity of binary operators is O(n log n) if each tuple of the ﬁrst relation
should be compared with each tuple in the second relation19. This includes the set operators, union and intersection,
as well as the comparison operations, equality and containment. Relational composition has an O(n3) computational
complexity20. Therefore, the computational complexity of the test described by Corollary 1 and computation de-
scribed by Corollary 2 are O(n3). The O(n3) complexity arises from the need to compute the composition of relations
in each of the tests and computations. As the complexity of relational composition is the most expensive operation,
it dominates the computational complexity of the algorithms for verifying the existence of an abstraction relation and
for computing the abstraction relation if it exists.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
We presented an algebraic technique using relations for detecting conﬁdential information leakage via protocol-
based covert channels which is part of the development of tools for investigative support for information conﬁden-
tiality. The technique does not rely on heuristics to uncover the use of covert channels. It gives a more formal and
rigorous approach and oﬀers a degree of simplicity. The technique provides tests to verify the existence of an abstrac-
tion relation and computations to ﬁnd the abstraction relation if it exists. These tests and computations are expandable
allowing for the technique to handle complex scenarios which may involve modulating the conﬁdential information,
for example. We also provided a short illustrative example showing the usage of a prototype tool that automates the
application of the proposed technique. The continued development of investigative support for information conﬁden-
tiality with the application and further automation of the proposed technique is discussed in Part II of this series of
papers12.
Further investigation into possible ways for improving the theoretical worst-case complexity for the tests and
computations of the proposed technique is left as future work. Currently, it is unclear how communication channels
can be eﬀectively sampled for random testing to determine if any conﬁdential information is being leaked. When
we sample a large stream of information, it is possible that we sample a portion of the communication stream which
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was leaking conﬁdential information. However, rather than the sample containing the conﬁdential information in
its entirety, it may only have a portion of it. There is a need to be able to detect whether a part of the conﬁdential
information is contained in the sampled communication stream. Also, the proposed detection technique handles
only protocol-based covert channels. We would like to extend the proposed technique in order to tackle the most
general covert channel possible where communication consists of a combination of environmental and protocol-based
knowledge. For example, in order to deal with channels based on the modulation of the timing of events, we can
extend the proposed technique by allowing for projections on points in time to construct the relation representing the
observed information based on the timing information. Finally, the continuing development of a more sophisticated
and conﬁgurable automation system to handle large scale covert channels and to implement the capabilities of the
communication monitors presented in Section 4.1 would be ideal.
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